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Ever since the notion of social capital gained attention in the academia, a 
considerable number of studies in economics have revealed positive 
impact of trust on economic growth (Algan & Cahuc, 2010; Dearmon & 
Grier, 2009; Knack & Keefer, 1997). While it is generally agreed that trust 
has a positive impact on economic development, the underlying 
mechanism has not been sufficiently disclosed. So far, La Porta et al. 
(1997) looked at institutions, Zak and Knack (2001) at investments, and 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) at financial development, and 
confirmed that trust promotes economic growth through these factors. 
However, no studies have examined how trust can influence an 
individual’s decision to participate in the labor market yet.    
 Considering the importance of trust on various factors pertaining 
to economic growth, it is a surprising fact that studies on the relationship 
between trust and labor market participation are lacking, as labor has 
traditionally been an important determinant of individuals’ productivity 
and income growth in theories of economics. High trust may promote 
labor market participation because trust reduces the “risk” of being 
employed. The risk can be regarded as the “perceived” probability of 
being treated unfairly by the employer, and/or the psychological cost of 
being employed in a distrusting environment.  
This study has drawn insights from previous research on the roles 
of trust. In higher-trust societies, individuals feel less obligated to invest in 
protective measures that prevent themselves from being exploited in 
economic transactions (Knack & Keefer, 1997). Trust also enables parties 
to coordinate their activities for mutual benefits and to reduce incentives 
for cheating (Kim & Kang, 2009). In fact, considering that trust decreases 
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the asymmetric information problem and increases efficiency in 
information sharing, high trust levels may reduce concerns that the other 
party will take advantage of asymmetric information or uncertainty 
(Dearmon & Grier, 2009). 
An individual perceives the society’s trust level, and makes 
decisions (including economic ones) accordingly. In Alesina & La Ferrara 
(2002), they propose that past experience potentially determines trust. For 
instance, if people live in a trusting environment in which they are used to 
being treated fairly, they are likely to trust others. Therefore, I conjecture 
that as trust increases in a society, individuals worry less about being 
cheated and expect that they will be treated fairly in the labor market, 
which increases their motivation to participate.  
 The underlying assumption is that there are three types of people. 
1) Those who choose to work regardless of the trust level in their 
environment, 2) those who choose not to work regardless of the trust level 
in their environment, and 3) those who change their working status 
depending on the trust level. These “people at the margin” are the people 
who would choose not to work in a society with distrust, but who would 
choose to have jobs in a trusting society. In other words, their value of 
making money is bigger than doing something else in a trusting 
environment, but the value of doing something else outpaces monetary 
values in an environment where distrust is permeating. For example, 
people in this category prefer to become housewives, students, or even 
stay unemployed in a distrusting society, but they prefer to work in a 
trusting society. The reason is that distrust discounts monetary gains from 
work, which makes non-monetary values become more salient.  
 In fact, some studies in economics recognize the psychological 
costs of distrust. Frey and Jegen (2001) mention two psychological 
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processes, 1) impaired self-determination and 2) impaired self-esteem, 
when negative external interventions affect intrinsic motivation. In Fehr 
and Falk (2002), they conduct an experiment that introduces a negative 
incentive scheme for workers; in case shirking of a worker is identified, a 
wage deduction is imposed. Workers, viewing the incentive system as a 
hostile act and a signal of distrust, may no longer put extra effort and even 
prefer shirking, although the expected cost of shirking exceeds the 
benefits of shirking. Therefore, comparing the environments with high 
trust and low trust, given the same amount of monetary rewards (extrinsic 
motivation), I speculate that intrinsic motivation for work is higher in the 
society with high trust, which attracts more people to work. 
In this paper, I examine the role of trust, which is a widely used 
proxy for social capital stock, in people’s labor market participating 
decisions. Measuring trust is still an area for debate, but I employ the 
method introduced in Knack and Keefer (1997), which has been used in 
many studies. In their cross-country study, a stock of trust is defined as the 
percentage of people within a country answering that “Most people can be 
trusted” when asked, “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 
While Glaeser et al. (2000) criticize that this method is obscure and 
propose conducting experiments for more accurate predictions, it is a 
relatively convenient and reliable measure that can be obtained through 
the existing data. I believe that the above measure of trust fulfills the 
concept of social capital introduced in Welch et al. (2005), which is 1) 
connections between people and 2) an individuals’ sum total of such 
connections. 
 Using primarily the United States’ General Social Survey data, I 
first conduct a Probit analysis to see whether trust affects individuals’ 
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labor market participation decisions. Trust is indeed statistically 
significantly associated with the probability of participating in the labor 
market. In order to examine trust’s degree of impact, I conduct an 
instrumental variable estimation by using information on the respondents’ 
ancestors and find that inherited trust plays a significant role. Furthermore, 
I construct a pseudo-panel out of the GSS data and investigate the 
relationship by using the fixed effects estimation. The method used by 
Kim & Kang (2009) is applied for the construction of the pseudo-panel, 
which is tracking agegroup cohorts in a given region over repeated cross-
sectional surveys. I find that trust promotes income growth through the 
channels of labor by using the following datasets: United States’ General 
Social Survey (GSS), the World Value Survey (WVS) and European 
Value Survey (EVS) data, and Tanja Ellingsen’s Fragmentation Data. 
In the following section, I review the literature on trust and on the 
relationship between social capital and labor market outcomes. In Section 
3, I explain the datasets used for the analyses in the paper in detail. 
Section 4 presents empirical strategy, and Section 5 reports the main 
results of the effects of trust on people’s labor market status obtained 
through several econometric techniques. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Trust as a Measure of Social Capital 
 
Among various measures of social capital, why do I focus on trust? First, 
it has been recognized as an essential factor of economic activities (Arrow, 
1972; Ferrary, 2003; Francis Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997; La 
Porta et al., 1997). Several studies have attempted to reveal the underlying 
mechanisms from trust to economic growth.  
For example, La Porta et al. (1997) examine the impact of trust on 
the performance of large organizations, which is measured by government 
effectiveness, participation in civic organizations, and size of the largest 
firms relative to GNP. They find that, in large organizations such as the 
government or civic associations, trust is essential for good performance.1 
Den Butter & Mosch (2003) find that there is a positive association 
between trust and bilateral trade as trust lowers transaction costs. Rather 
than focusing on physical distance, they focus on cultural and institutional 
distances, implying that different cultural background may discourage 
trade between regions and people. They estimate that a one standard 
deviation rise in trust is associated with more than 100 percent increase in 
the value of bilateral trade. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) study 
the effect of trust on financial development in Italy. They find that trust 
plays an important and positive role in financial development, which is 
measured by the probability of using checks, the proportion of wealth a 
household invests in cash, the proportion of financial wealth invested in 
stock, and the probability of buying stocks. Specifically, they find that 
trust statistically significantly increases the probability of using checks, 
                                                        
1 They measure civic participation with the percentage of civic activities in which an 
average individual participates and government efficiency with four proxies 
(judiciary efficiency, corruption, bureaucratic quality, and tax compliance). 
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has a negative and highly statistically significant effect on the proportion 
of wealth a household invests in cash, and has a statistically positive effect 
on the proportion of financial wealth invested in stock. In their later study, 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) find out that trust plays an important 
role in raising the probability of buying stocks.  
Second, trust is one of the most important determinants of social 
capital. Researchers on social capital agree that trust is one of social 
capital’s main elements. For example, Fukuyama (1995) considers trust, 
strong family ties, strong associations outside of kinship, and culture as 
elements of social capital. Portes (1998), defining social capital as “the 
ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social 
networks or other social structures,” recognizes trust, social contacts and 
networks as sources of social capital.  
Nevertheless, trust is at the core of the concept of social capital. 
Many significant studies treat social capital and trust as synonymous 
(Arrow, 1972; Glaeser et al., 2000; Putnam, 1995). Welch et al. (2005) 
express trust as a building block of social solidarity, cooperation, 
solidarity, and altruism. Furthermore, they argue that trust enhances 
workers’ job performance and satisfaction, which leads to increased 
morale, productivity, and profitability of the organization. In economics, it 
is well-accepted that trust reduces uncertainty and risk in market 
transactions. Trust is an important factor that enables successful 
interpersonal transactions among strangers or unacquainted people (La 




2.2 Social Capital and the Labor Market 
 
There indeed exist scholarly evidences that social capital has a significant 
influence on a person’s labor market participating decisions. However, 
studies so far have used proxies and concepts of social capital other than 
trust--such as social contacts and networks, as mentioned in the subsection 
above--to find out the relationship between labor market participation and 
social capital. Nevertheless, it is worth going over some of the important 
hypotheses regarding this issue.  
The role of social capital in an individual’s labor market 
participation decisions goes back as far as Granovetter’s concept of 
Strength of Weak Ties (1973).2 He argues that many job seekers get 
employed by utilizing their social contacts rather than only formal 
channels, and that a job found through social contacts results in higher 
wages and job satisfaction. His logic is that as social interaction transmits 
information, details about people and jobs flow through social networks. 
The already established social connections lower search costs for 
recruitment. Here, weak ties are more useful than strong ties because 
acquaintances are less redundant and less similar to us than close friends, 
and they connect us to a wider world. Granovetter (1995) finds evidence 
that the large majority of nonsearchers (i.e. people who land in jobs 
without searching for one) found jobs through personal contacts. Also, 
there is evidence that those entering a firm through social contacts have 
lower quit rates, even after controlling for ability or quality of worker 
(Granovetter, 2005). 
                                                        
2 Granovetter’s definition of the strength of an interpersonal tie is “a combination of the 
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and the 
reciprocal services that characterize the tie” (Granovetter, 1973). For example, strong ties 
refer to close friends and immediate family and weak ties refer to acquaintances. 
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Franzen and Hangartner (2006) raise questions to two of 
Granovetter’s arguments; 1) jobs found through social contacts are better 
paid and more satisfying, and 2) weak ties are better than strong ties. 
Instead, they take in Montgomery (1992)’s view that the expected wage 
from weak-tie offers may be lower than the wage expected from strong-tie 
offers, and argue that wages do not differ whether the job was found 
through weak ties or strong ties. Using the data on social relations and 
support systems (ISSP 2001) and on Swiss university graduates, they find 
that finding a job through the network has non-monetary advantages for 
labor market entrances. 
Ioannides and Loury (2004) summarize the findings of the first 
generation of empirical work on job information networks. 1) There is 
increasingly widespread use of friends, relatives, and acquaintances to 
search for jobs, 2) such use often varies by location and by demographic 
characteristics, 3) job search through friends and relatives yields more 
offers per contact, 4) the part of the variation in the productivity of job 
search by demographic group reflects differences in usage of contacts, 5) 
many differences in productivity of job search by age, gender, race and 
ethnic group cannot be completely accounted for by differences in usage. 
 Aguilera and Massey (2003) find a positive association between 
social capital (measured by interpersonal connections) and wages among 
Mexican immigrants in the US. For undocumented migrants, in particular, 
the probability of getting a job through friends or relatives is higher than 
their legal counterparts. They imply that workers facing employment 
barriers (e.g. legal restrictions, discrimination, and structural constraints) 
can utilize social capital to circumvent these barriers. Borghans, Ter Weel, 
and Weinberg (2006) find that people skills, measured by work 
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adaptability and personality traits, are important in determining labor 
market outcomes, including wages and occupations.  
Not all studies view social capital positively in affecting labor 
market outcomes. They regard investments in social capital and 
investments in labor as substitutes. For example, they argue that the more 
people invest in spending time with family, the less time/effort they spend 
at work. Algan et al. (2010) argue that countries with strong family ties 
prefer rigid labor market conditions because moving away from home is 
costly. Therefore, low efficiency and employment are the tradeoffs for 
benefits of strong family ties. Bartolini and Bilancini (2011) investigate 
the relationship between social participation and the number of hours 
worked. As social capital and private consumptions are partial substitutes, 
economic growth generates negative externality that reduces social capital, 
and individuals force themselves to rely on material goods to maintain 
their well-being, which results in long working hours and increased output.  
Costa and Kahn (2003) also recognize a trade-off between social 
hours and working hours, but the evidences that these studies bring are not 
sufficient to prove that individuals reduce hours to socialize due to 
increased hours at work. In fact, Aguiar and Hurst (2007) find evidence 
that Americans have enjoyed more leisure while keeping hours at work 
relatively constant over the few decades. Moreover, those who view work 
and sociability as substitutes do not take into account personality 
differences. For example, individuals with long working hours may 
engage in more civic activities because they are more ambitious 
(Rupasingha et al, 2006; Saffer and Lamiraud, 2008). In fact, Rupasingha 
et al. (2006) find evidence that employed women actually participate more 
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in Putnam groups and less in Olson groups3. Saffer and Lamiraud (2008) 
use a natural experimental setting, which is the enaction of a French law 
in 1998 that reduced the legal number of weekly working hours from 39 to 
35, and find that reduced working hours do not affect the hours used for 
social interactions.  
The above studies on social capital and labor market outcomes use 
social contacts/networks as proxies for social capital. However, as 
mentioned in the earlier sub-section, no attempts have been made, to my 
best knowledge, to investigate the relationship between trust, the most 
important factor constituting social capital, and labor market outcomes. In 
this paper, I hope to contribute to the current debate on social capital and 
labor market by utilizing trust, a more convenient and widely used 
measure of social capital, as a proxy for social capital.  
  
                                                        
3 Putnam views that cooperation among members of a group creates habits and attitudes 
toward serving the greater good that leads to members’ interactions with non-members 
(e.g. religious organizations, education and cultural groups, youth groups). On the other 
hand, Olson views that cooperation within a particular group with the purpose of raising 
the welfare of members of the group can worsen the welfare of non-members (e.g. 




The main dataset I use is from the United States’ General Social Survey, 
which has been conducted across the U.S. almost every other year from 
1972 to 2010. The subjects were aged 18 or more living in non-
institutionalized residences. From 1972 to 2004, the target population was 
English-speakers only and from 2006 onward, Spanish-speakers was 
added. Each survey contains more than 1,500 completed interviews, 
reaching 55,087 interviews in total. This study uses the cumulative data 
file, provided by National Opinion Research Center, which is obtained by 
merging all 28 General Social Surveys.4 The survey contains questions on 
demographics, family, income, working status, religion, attitudes and 
perceptions on the society, etc. As most people in the United States are 
descendants of immigrants or immigrants themselves, the survey also 
contains information on country of the respondents’ ancestors.  
Using this information of the GSS, I linked the ancestors’ country 
to the country data of WVS and EVS in order to create proxies for the 
respondents’ trust. The WVS has been conducted five times, in 1981, 
1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, in 87 countries across the world, and the 
EVS has been conducted four times, in 1981, 1990, 1999, and 2008 in 49 
countries, mainly in Europe. Both Surveys have 1000 to 1500 randomly 
selected adults in each of the countries. As these two dataset share core 
variables and complement each other in terms of geographic coverage, 
hereafter I will refer to the merged version of these data as Value Surveys 
(VS). Based on the VS, I set the first waves’ trust level of an individual’s 
ancestor’s country—as earlier data are not available—as the proxy for 
individual’s inherited trust. For example, if an individual’s ancestors are 
                                                        
4 Specifically, the survey years are 1972-1978, 1980, 1982-91, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. 
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from Italy, I use the trust level of Italy in 1981 as the proxy for the 
individual’s trust level. As the trust level can be affected by the degree of 
economic prosperity of the country, I also create a proxy for trust that 
equals the residual values after regressing trust and GDP per capita 
(obtained from World Bank data) of the country. 
The above approach of using one’s trust stock as the trust level of 
one’s country of origin is based on the evidence that parents’ social capital 
is a good predictor of children’s social capital (Rice and Feldman, 1997; 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006) and that people tend to apply the 
trust of the environment in which they are born to the new environment in 
which they live (Osili and Paulson, 2008; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
2004; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008). Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales (2006) find that the origin of ancestors has a significant effect on 
trust, meaning that the effect of trust is strong when ancestors come from 
high-trusting countries today. Therefore, the trust of the immigrants would 
partly be composed of the trust level of their home countries, and the 
descendants of the immigrants would inherit their ancestors’ level of trust.  
 In fact, Algan and Cahuc (2010) reveal the causal effect of trust on 
economic development by trying to control for specific invariant national 
or regional factors. They avoid reverse causality between trust and 
economic development by focusing on the inherited component of trust, 
which precedes economic development. Using the trust of US descendants 
whose parents were/are immigrants, they find that the inherited 
component of trust has a significant effect on economic development.  
In addition, there are evidences that culture (defined by religion 
and ethnicity) affects prior beliefs about trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales, 2006). Using this evidence, I merge the countries’ degree of 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization obtained from the 
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Fragmentation Data into the trust and economic variables obtained from 
the VS and the World Bank datasets. Compiled by Tanja Ellingsen, the 
Fragmentation dataset measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious heterogeneity in the countries worldwide based on Handbook of 
the Nations, Britannica Book of the Year, and Demographic Yearbook. 
The degree of fragmentation of ancestors’ countries serves as instruments 
for trust of ancestors’ countries. 
After merging all of the datasets above, I construct a pseudo-panel 
by identifying individuals belonging to the same age group within a region, 
by averaging the values of individual variables over a five-year interval. I 
include individuals aged between 18 and 65 only, as those outside this 
range participate significantly less in the labor market due to their 
distinctive characteristics. Except for the youngest agegroup (from 18 to 
20), each agegroup is formed by dividing age at a five-year interval (from 
21 to 25, from 26 to 30, and so on).  
Because of the sensitivity issues, the GSS data do not provide the 
respondent’s state of residence. Instead, their residence is coded at the 
region-level. A region encompasses several states and the U.S. is divided 
into nine regions, as specified in Appendix A1. This may be one of the 
limitations of my paper since region covers an area too big to measure 
trust at the community level. Nevertheless, it is a useful measure of 
individuals’ trust stock as the variations of trust across regions are still 




Figure 1. Trust Trends by Region 
 
Note: The vertical axis indicates the proportion of people who answered “Most people 
can be trusted” in the region. Refer to Appendix A1 for states and regions in detail. 
 
 Table 1 shows the respondents’ or their ancestors’ countries of 
origin obtained from the GSS data. Unfortunately, the information on the 
specific country of origin is not available for those from Africa. Therefore, 
I treat Africa as a country and obtain its trust level by averaging the 
African countries’ trust levels in the VS data. The table reports figures in 
percentage of people who responded that “Most people can be trusted” 
from the GSS and from the VS, respectively. For example, 16.72% of 
those who have ancestral origins in Africa among the GSS respondents 
trust most people, and 14.75% of those in the African countries that 
participated in the VS survey answered that they trust most people. We 
can see that the values in the two surveys are similar (ρ=0.56). This 
implies that people inherit a considerable part of trust from their 




Table 1. The Originating Countries of the Respondents’ Ancestors 
  “Trust most people”  
Country of family origin N GSS VS 
Africa 3526 16.72 14.75 
Austria 181 40.35 28.36 
Canada 682 41.12 47.05 
China 201 42.98 59.40 
Czech Republic 462 44.90 27.78 
Denmark 268 52.30 47.21 
United Kingdom 5643 50.21 29.09 
Finland 168 54.90 56.03 
France 787 45.99 23.08 
Germany 6311 44.09 26.82 
Greece 171 39.29 20.49 
Hungary 223 44.00 32.31 
Ireland 4333 44.93 39.52 
Italy 2090 39.28 25.89 
Japan 122 41.56 37.87 
Mexico 1636 22.97 16.88 
Netherlands 551 42.42 39.31 
Norway 663 55.58 55.47 
Philippines 197 20.83 5.50 
Poland 1066 43.04 31.34 
Puerto Rico 451 15.44 5.93 
Russian Federation 525 47.15 34.73 
Spain 395 31.76 32.91 
Sweden 595 52.45 52.10 
Switzerland 149 56.60 26.29 
India 191 33.83 33.52 
Portugal 126 32.95 21.01 
Lithuania 96 42.86 30.80 
Slovenia 142 46.91 16.33 
Romania 58 31.58 15.78 
Belgium 69 53.66 25.50 
Saudi Arabia 86 37.04 50.53 
United States 2730 24.31 39.35 
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Note: In the GSS, the United Kingdom and Canada were categorized into smaller units. 
The people whose ancestral countries were England, Wales and Scotland were assigned 
the UK’s trust value, the people with ancestral origins of Canada were assigned Canada’s 
trust, and those with American origins (who indicated America or American Indians) 
were assigned the US’ trust value. I did not assign any trust level to those who indicated 
that their ancestral origins are the variations of “Other,” or “West Indies,” as identifying 
their countries was impossible. I assigned the trust level of Czech Republic to those who 
indicated that they were from Czechoslovakia, and the trust level of Slovenia to those 





4. Empirical Strategy 
 
The impact of trust on individuals’ labor market participation decision can 
be expressed as the following equation 
 
(1)           𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑆𝑟𝑡 +  𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝐹𝑟 + 𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡 stands for the individual i’s labor market participation status in 
region r at year t. The variable 𝑆𝑟𝑡 measures the region mean of trust of 
individuals who live in region r at year t, and 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 is the vector of 
individual characteristics such as age, sex, years of education, income, 
marital status, and spouse’s labor market participation status. 𝐹𝑟 stands for 
region fixed effects, 𝐹𝑡 stands for year fixed effects common to all regions, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 is an error term. We are interested in the true value of 𝛼1. 
However, equation (1) is exposed to the problem of endogeneity as 
trust can be correlated with the unobserved error term 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡. Algan and 
Cahuc (2010) deals with this issue by separating the contemporaneous and 
the inherited components of trust. Their assumption is that current trust is 
determined by all factors which are likely to influence economic 
performance and by the previous generations’ level of trust, and that the 
previous generations’ trust is excluded from the equation (1) so that 
𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 ⊥ 𝑆𝑟𝑡−1. Applying their model, we derive the following model: 
 
(2)            𝑆𝑟𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑆𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑟𝑡 +  Φ𝑟 +  Φ𝑡 + 𝜈𝑟𝑡 
 
where 𝑆𝑟𝑡−1 denotes the region mean of trust of the previous generation in 
period t-1, 𝑍𝑟𝑡 denotes a vector of time varying characteristics of the 
region and 𝜈𝑟𝑡 is an error term. However, rather than trying to estimate 
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equation (2) as in Algan and Cahuc (2010), in this paper, I would like to 
carry over their insight that there is an inherited component of trust into 
the instrumental variable estimation.  
The proxy for inherited trust of people in region r is the average 
value of trust of the country that individuals’ ancestors emigrated from 
and is obtained from the VS. Since the earliest wave of VS is 1981, I use 
the trust value in 1981 to proxy for individual’s inherited trust. As trust 
has been proven to be associated with economic development, I use the 
residual value after regressing trust on GDP per capita (as mentioned in 
Section 3 in detail) as the proxy for trust in the instrumental variable 
estimation. 
The second stage of the instrumental variable estimation is 
specified in Equation (3), 
(3)            𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 +  𝜔𝑖𝑟𝑡 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡 stands for the individual i’s labor market participation status in 
region r at year t. The variable 𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 denotes the residual values of trust 
of individual i’s ancestors who lived in country c at t-1, 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 is the vector 
of individual controls, and 𝜔𝑖𝑟𝑡 is the error term. 
 The first stage of the instrumental variable estimation is specified 
in Equation (4), 
(4)            𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 =  𝛿0 +  𝛿1𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡−1′ + 𝜂𝑖𝑟𝑡 
 
where 𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡−1′ denotes the vector of the fragmentation variables of the 
country c at time t-1’ (which does not necessarily coincide with t-1 due to 
data) and 𝜂𝑖𝑟𝑡 is the error term. 
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 After analyzing data at the individual level, I transform the dataset 
into a pseudo-panel in order to obtain more accurate estimates. The 
specification of the pseudo-panel is as follows, 
 
(5)            𝐿𝑗𝑟𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑇𝑗𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑋𝑗𝑟𝑡 +  𝜁𝑗𝑟𝑡 
 
where subscripts j, r, and t denote cohort, region, and year, respectively. 
𝐿𝑗𝑟𝑡 denotes the share of employed in cohort j in region r in year t. 𝑇𝑗𝑟𝑡 is 
the share of those who trust most people in cohort j in region r in year t, 
𝑋𝑗𝑟𝑡 is the vector of cohort controls and 𝜁𝑗𝑟𝑡 is the error term. 
 Since it may be a stretch to think that an individual is affected by 
the trust stock of agegroup, rather than the trust of community regardless 
of age, in making a decision on the labor market participation, I also 
conduct analyses using 𝑇𝑟𝑡 instead of 𝑇𝑗𝑟𝑡 to check how the results change. 
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5. Estimation Results 
 
I first examine the effect of trust either as a stock (i.e. the proportion of 
people in the region who answered that they can trust most people) or as 
an attitude (i.e. whether the individual trust most people or not) on the 
individual’s labor market participation decision. Table 2 reports the results 
from Probit estimation. Column (1)-(2) present the regression results 
when the variable of trust is defined as a stock, and Column (3)-(6) 
present the results when the variable of trust is an indicator variable. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual 
works either full-time or part-time, or if the individual is taking a break 
due to illness, strike or other reasons. The dummy is zero if the 
respondents indicated their working status as students, keeping house, 
unemployed, or “other.”5 The control variables include the respondent’s 
age, sex, years of education, marital status, number of children, spouse’ 
working status, and race. In order to control for the region’s demand side 
of the labor market, I add the region’s annual average unemployment rates 
as a control variable. 
Although Column (1) and (2) report positive and significant 
coefficient for trust, the variable used in the regression, the regional level 
of trust, may seem problematic since the variable has only 9 distinct 
values for the entire individual observations for the specific year. 
Therefore, I would like to focus on the results in Column (3)-(6) where the 
trust variable is the indicator variable of an individual’s attitude. Although 
this may not be a stock variable, it is nonetheless a meaningful indicator 
that reflects trust. The results in Column (3) tell us that when an individual 
                                                        
5 Even if I exclusively set the control group as those who indicated their work status as 
“unemployed,” the regression results do not differ significantly. For descriptive statistics, 
refer to Appendix A3. 
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has trusting attitude, he/she is 3% more likely to participate in the labor 
market, given other controls at the mean value (refer to Appendix A4 for 
the marginal effect value of trust). Trust, whether as a stock or an attitude, 
seems to be significantly associated with an individual’s decision to 
participate in the labor market. 
To see whether trust exerts different degrees of influence on men 
and women, I include an interaction term (Trust*male) in Column (5). The 
coefficient value (-0.023) is statistically insignificant but negative, 
implying that the effect of trust may be bigger for women in making 
decisions on labor market participation, since men generally face a higher 
pressure to work as main breadwinners in the family. 
Since attitude of an individual may depend on his/her personality 
which again can affect the participation status, I add another variable, 
perceived fairness, that can possibly control for such individual 
characteristics. The variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent answered that people try to be fair and 0 otherwise, when 
asked “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if 
they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” Column (4) presents the 
results after adding the fairness variable, which does not significantly 
alter results compared to those in Column (3). 
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Table 2. The Effect of Trust on Labor Market Participation:  
Probit Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Trust 0.302* 0.406** 0.104*** 0.0872*** 0.113*** 0.121*** 
 (1.873) (2.061) (5.194) (3.933) (4.512) (5.061) 
Fairness  0.0572***  0.0272   
  (2.953)  (1.297)   
Age 0.150*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.115*** 
 (35.94) (29.92) (30.50) (29.45) (30.48) (19.03) 
Age2 -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0015*** 
 (-37.87) (-31.53) (-32.21) (-31.10) (-32.19) (-20.93) 
Sex 0.555*** 0.597*** 0.568*** 0.587*** 0.576*** 0.573*** 
 (35.02) (30.80) (30.26) (29.77) (25.08) (24.86) 
Trust*male     -0.0229  
     (-0.594)  
Education 0.0758*** 0.0784*** 0.0748*** 0.0760*** 0.0749*** 0.0775*** 
 (26.96) (22.28) (21.88) (20.99) (21.89) (18.01) 
Marital 
status 
-0.0406* -0.0289 -0.0147 -0.0213 -0.0143 0.153*** 
 (-1.692) (-0.994) (-0.518) (-0.718) (-0.504) (4.248) 
Children -0.0601*** -0.0606*** -0.0598*** -0.0597*** -0.0597*** -0.0626*** 
 (-11.36) (-9.523) (-9.621) (-9.222) (-9.602) (-8.252) 
Spouse’s 
work status 
0.0461* 0.0138 0.00895 0.00928 0.00842 0.240*** 
 (1.919) (0.478) (0.316) (0.314) (0.297) (7.006) 
Other race -0.0438 -0.0153 -0.0176 -0.00820 -0.0177 -0.0254 
 (-1.369) (-0.364) (-0.452) (-0.193) (-0.454) (-0.536) 
Black -0.141*** -0.125*** -0.141*** -0.119*** -0.140*** -0.138*** 
 (-6.405) (-4.582) (-5.337) (-4.292) (-5.323) (-4.151) 
Unemploym
ent rate 
-0.0151 -0.00759 -0.00835 -0.00812 -0.00836 -0.0256* 
 (-1.481) (-0.676) (-0.735) (-0.703) (-0.735) (-1.899) 
Log  family 
income 
     -0.0402*** 
      (-3.714) 
Constant -3.354*** -3.560*** -3.319*** -3.381*** -3.321*** -2.349*** 
 (-21.74) (-19.67) (-21.21) (-21.00) (-21.22) (-11.16) 
       
Observations 35,998 24,359 25,822 23,617 25,822 16,566 
 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating the respondent’s work status. Region and year 
dummies were included in the regressions but their coefficients are not reported in the table. Sex is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when the respondent is male, marital status is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the 
respondent is married, spouse’s work status is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent’s spouse 
works full-time/part-time or is on break, other race, and black are dummy variables indicating the 
respondent’s race. Unemployment rate is the region’s annual average unemployment rate. 
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I exclude the income variable in the regression because the GSS 
does not provide the information on the exact income in monetary units, 
but it is coded into a categorical value. Therefore, the income variable I 
use is an imputed value which does not reflect the variation within the 
same income category. Nevertheless, even after adding the log of annual 
family income (after removing the respondent’s income) variable in the 
regression, the trust variable has a statistically significant coefficient 
(Column 6). 
In order to reveal causality between trust and labor market 
participation, I employ instruments for the trust proxy, which is the trust 
level in ancestors’ country that is orthogonal of the country’s economic 
influence (see Section 3 for more detail). Here, I use a proxy for trust that 
is different from the ones used for the Probit estimation due to the 
following reasons; 1) The trust level of ancestors’ country maintains the 
characteristics of “stock” as opposed to the indicator variable used in the 
previous regression. 2) Compared to the region-level trust, it offers much 
more variations across individuals as the number of originating countries 
(as seen in Table 1) is bigger than the number of regions (as seen in 
Appendix A1).  
Since I have information on the individuals’ ancestral country 
(from the GSS) and on the countries’ trust level and GDP (from the VS 
and the World Bank, respectively), I can assign the “inherited” component 
of trust to individuals. The instruments used for inherited trust are the 
degree of religious, ethnic, and linguistic fragmentation of the country. As 
seen in Table 3, we see a statistically significant coefficient of the trust 
level of the country of origin. The instruments pass the relevance test with 
the Wald-statistics of 11.79.  
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Compared to the results in Table 1 and 2, the coefficient of trust is 
much larger than when measured by the region stock but similar when 
measured by the individual’s attitude. Since Column (1) in Table 1 and the 
IV regression both use trust stocks, I will compare these two as an 
example. Given other controls at the mean level, an increase in the trust 
level by 1 SD (0.08) leads to 0.77% higher probability of being employed 
(Column (1) in Table 2). On the other hand, the results of Table 3 tell us 
that a 1 SD (0.09) increase in trust level of home country leads to 2.7% 
higher probability of being employed, given other controls at the mean 
level (refer to Appendix A4 for marginal effects). Perhaps an individual’s 
decision to work depends much more on the values created over a long 
span of time, such as inherited trust from ancestors, rather than trust level 
at the moment. While it is difficult to delve into the origins of trust—how 
and when trust is formed, it is clear that even the inherited component of 




Table 3. The Effect of Inherited Trust: IV Estimation Results 
  
















Spouse’ work status 0.0152 
 (0.585) 











z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating the respondent’s work status. Region 
and year dummies were included in the regressions but their coefficients are not reported in the 
table. Sex is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent is male, marital status is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent is married, spouse’s work status is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when the respondent’s spouse works full-time/part-time or is on break, other 
race, and black are dummy variables indicating the respondent’s race. Unemployment rate is the 


















Spouse’s work status 0.000882 
 (0.620) 
















z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2(1) =    11.79           Prob > chi2 = 0.0006 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the trust level after eliminating the influence of GDP per capita of 
the ancestral country. Region and year dummies were included in the regressions but their 
coefficients are not reported in the table. Ethnicity, language, and religion are the variables that 





In order to find a stronger evidence for my hypothesis that trust 
affects people’s intrinsic motivation to work, which affects their labor 
market outcomes, I examined whether trust has a different impact on 
prime-age (from 24 to 54) male respondents. Since social and cultural 
norms tend to force prime-age males into labor market regardless of their 
motivation, trust has to have a smaller impact for people in this category. 
In Table 4, I added interaction terms in order to examine the difference in 
impact of trust on females, prime-age male workers, and non-prime age 
male workers. Column (1) presents the results of simple Probit estimation, 
and Column (2) reports the results of IV estimation using the same 
instrumental variables as in Table 3. The interaction term (Trust* prime) 
captures the difference between prime-age male respondents and non-
prime age male respondents, and it has mixed results depending on the 
specification. The Probit estimation yields a positive association, meaning 
that prime-age males tend to be more heavily influenced by trust, which 
contradicts my hypothesis. However, the IV results present a statistically 
insignificant but negative coefficient, implying that prime-age male 
respondents are less exposed to the effect of trust after using the IV 
strategy which is generally a better tool in the presence of the endogeniety 
bias. The interaction term, Trust*male, which captures the difference 
between non-prime age male respondents and female respondents has 
negative coefficients for both Probit regression and IV regression results. 
This implies that female respondents are more sensitive to the effect of 
trust than non-prime age male respondents. Although the IV estimation 
may not entirely resolve the endogeneity issue, at least the results 
insinuate that trust exerts different degrees of impact on marginal and 




Table 4. The Effect of Trust: Probit and IV Results 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
Trust 0.112*** 1.825*** 
 (4.506) (3.289) 
Age 0.132*** 0.128*** 
 (23.02) (23.87) 
Age2 -0.00164*** -0.00159*** 
 (-23.92) (-24.86) 
Sex 0.476*** 0.385*** 
 (13.56) (14.28) 
Prime age 0.154*** 0.268*** 
 (3.676) (8.169) 
Trust*male -0.142*** -1.897*** 
 (-2.672) (-3.229) 
Trust*prime 0.209*** -0.113 
 (3.361) (-0.355) 
Education 0.0752*** 0.0723*** 
 (21.92) (22.69) 
Married -0.0231 -0.0613** 
 (-0.812) (-2.346) 
Children -0.0585*** -0.0571*** 
 (-9.401) (-9.932) 
Spouse’ work status 0.0202 0.0274 
 (0.708) (1.053) 
Other race -0.0167 0.000808 
 (-0.428) (0.0216) 
Black -0.139*** -0.0763** 
 (-5.293) (-2.397) 
Unemployment rate -0.00853 -0.0176* 
 (-0.749) (-1.709) 
Constant -2.985*** -2.760*** 
 (-18.07) (-18.29) 
   
Observations 25,822 29,957 
 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: The dependent variable for Column (1) is a dummy variable indicating the respondent’s 
work status. Column (2) is the second stage results for the IV regression (refer to Appedix A6 for 
the first stage results). The dependent variable for Column (2) is the trust level after eliminating the 
influence of GDP per capita of the ancestral country. Region and year dummies were included in 
the regressions but their coefficients are not reported in the table. Ethnicity, language, and religion 






So far we have seen results at the individual level, and now we 
move on to a pseudo-panel analysis. According to Kim and Kang (2009), 
the pseudo-panel approach has several advantages. First, it reduces 
measurement errors that are problematic in empirical investigation, since 
it uses the mean of cohorts. Second, it helps deal with subjective variables 
(i.e. the variables depending on the perceptions of members of the 
community) such as trust. Since an individual’s decision to participate in 
the labor market can be influenced by the degree of perceived importance 
of trust, taking the mean value of trust within cohort may deviate less.  
After constructing the pseudo-panel, the average observations in 
each cohort are 585 persons. Column 1 and 2 in Table 5 contain 
regression results of the OLS estimation with the pseudo-panel data. Here, 
all variables are the mean values at the cohort level. For example, the trust 
variable is the proportion of people trusting most people within the cohort, 
and the education variable is the cohort’s average years of education that 
people completed. Here, we see that the coefficient is insignificant and 
nearly zero for trust (Column 1 and 2). However, when we take the mean 
value of the region for trust (Column 3 and 4), the association turns to be 
positive and significant. Adding Fairness variable does not alter the results 
significantly. 
 The mean value of trust at the cohort level is insignificantly 
associated with an individual’s labor market participation, but the region-
mean value of trust is significantly associated. Comparing the two results, 
I lean toward using the regional mean value of trust because trust shared 
with people (regardless of age), rather than trust shared among those in the 
same agegroup (maximum 4 years of difference), is likely to influence an 
individual’s decision to participate in the labor market. For instance, a 
student is more likely to be influenced by the trust level of its 
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community—such as, city—than by the trust level of her friends when 




Table 5. Trust at the Region-level and at the Cohort-level: 
 Pooled OLS Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Trust -0.0165 -0.00799 0.188* 0.197** 
 (-0.537) (-0.250) (1.901) (1.988) 
Fairness  -0.0177  -0.0211 
  (-1.046)  (-1.289) 
Age 0.0525*** 0.0527*** 0.0528*** 0.0531*** 
 (15.29) (15.33) (15.41) (15.47) 
Age2 -0.000622*** -0.000623*** -0.000627*** -0.000628*** 
 (-16.37) (-16.40) (-16.51) (-16.54) 
Sex 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 
 (5.672) (5.661) (5.561) (5.575) 
Marital status -0.0312 -0.0335 -0.0289 -0.0333 
 (-0.629) (-0.674) (-0.585) (-0.673) 
Education 0.0235*** 0.0243*** 0.0221*** 0.0233*** 
 (4.522) (4.628) (4.279) (4.436) 
Spouse’s work 
status 
0.0812 0.0824 0.0797 0.0829 
 (1.551) (1.575) (1.533) (1.594) 
Whites -0.0564 -0.0590 -0.0618 -0.0620 
 (-0.741) (-0.775) (-0.819) (-0.822) 
Blacks -0.0260 -0.0345 -0.0145 -0.0234 
 (-0.293) (-0.388) (-0.164) (-0.264) 
Children -0.0401*** -0.0398*** -0.0419*** -0.0411*** 
 (-4.165) (-4.134) (-4.406) (-4.315) 
Constant -0.606*** -0.600*** -0.695*** -0.694*** 
 (-6.937) (-6.856) (-6.991) (-6.982) 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
R-squared 0.679 0.680 0.681 0.682 
 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the proportion of people in the cohort participating in the labor 
market. Region and year dummies were included in the regressions but their coefficients are not 
reported in the table. 
32 
Fixed effects estimation with the pseudo-panel data yields similar 
results (Table 6). Here, I used a three-way fixed effect model, which takes 
into account both region and agegroup fixed effects. Using the cohort’s 
mean of trust provides insignificant and nearly zero coefficient (Column 
1). On the other hand, using the region-mean of trust provides significant 
and positive coefficient (Column 2).6 
 
  
                                                        
6 The coefficient stays significant and becomes slightly bigger when the variable 
indicating the proportion of people who believe that they are treated fairly is added. 
33 
Table 6. Trust at the Region-level and at the Cohort-level:  
Fixed Effects Estimation 
 (1) (2) 
Trust 0.00592 0.190** 
 (0.184) (2.009) 
Sex 0.229*** 0.226*** 
 (5.879) (5.831) 
Marital status -0.0194 -0.0225 
 (-0.339) (-0.394) 
Children -0.0310*** -0.0317*** 
 (-3.231) (-3.339) 
Education 0.0176*** 0.0165*** 
 (3.030) (2.867) 
Spouse’s work status 0.0243 0.0282 
 (0.440) (0.511) 
Whites -0.0592 -0.0576 
 (-0.781) (-0.766) 
Blacks -0.0349 -0.0204 
 (-0.392) (-0.229) 
Constant 0.409*** 0.336*** 
 (4.189) (3.261) 
   
Observations 720 720 
R-squared 0.308 0.312 
Number of s 90 90 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the proportion of people in the cohort participating in the labor 
market. Region, agegroup and year dummies were included in the regressions but their coefficients 






From the GSS data, I investigate how trust affects individuals’ decision to 
participate in the labor market. By doing so, I try to reveal a channel 
through which trust promotes economic development, by arguing that a 
trust stock in the society motivates an individual to participate in the labor 
market, which increases the individual’s income, and, in aggregate, the 
society’s economic growth.  
 I use various econometric estimation methods in order to reveal 
the causality between trust and labor market participation. When trust is 
measured with a dummy variable whether an individual trusts in general, 
trust seems to be associated with the individual’s labor market 
participation. Therefore, it implies that a trusting individual is more likely 
to work. The instrumental variable estimation results show that the 
inherited component of trust plays an important role in the individual’s 
decision to participate in the labor market. The estimation results confirms 
the thought that trust is a complex capital that is formed over a long span 
of time, from generation to generation, which affect people’s economic 
decisions. 
 Furthermore, I construct a pseudo-panel by grouping individuals 
with similar ages in the same region and averaging values over a 5-year 
interval from 1972 to 2010. From the OLS and fixed effects results, I find 
that the trust stock constructed at the cohort level does not play a 
significant role in determining the proportion of people in the labor market, 
but that the trust stock at the regional level is significantly associated with 
the proportion of people in the labor market. This does not violate the 
common sense that an individual is influenced by the trust level in the 
overall society, rather than by the trust level of their contemporaries in 
making a decision whether to work or not. 
35 
 Although this study provides meaningful findings, it has 
limitations mainly due to data. As the survey provides respondents’ 
residence only at the regional level, the stock of trust does not accurately 
reflect the trust level in the individuals’ communities. If I can obtain more 
detailed information on the residence, I expect that estimating a more 
accurate impact of trust on the individual’s labor market participation 
decision will be possible. Another limitation of this study is that we 
cannot exactly tell whether individuals actually face a decrease in 
motivation to work due to a distrusting environment. I only hypothesize 
that distrust increases costs for participating in the labor market based on 
the existing studies, but this cannot be confirmed with the data used in this 
paper. In order to find out, we need a survey or experiment that is 
designed to investigate the relationship between trust and individual’s 
motivation to work, or a closer investigation of trust’s impact on marginal 
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Table A1. The Regions in the United States 
 
Region 1 New England Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island 
Region 2 Middle Atlantic New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania 
Region 3 E. North Central Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio 
Region 4 W. North Central North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri 
Region 5 South Atlantic West Virginia, District of Columbia, Maryland, 
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Florida, Georgia 
Region 6 E. South Central Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama 
Region 7 W. South Central Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana 
Region 8 Mountain Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, 
Utah, Nevada, Montana 
























       atrust 0.45 1 
      
 
(0) 
       itrust 0.19 0.19 1 
     
 
(0) (0) 
      education 0.02 0.06 0.22 1 
    
 
(0) (0) (0) 
     male 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 1 
   
 
(-0.01) (-0.07) (0) (0) 
    age -0.02 0.59 0.11 -0.08 0 1 
  
 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (-0.77) 
   labor -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.21 0.21 -0.07 1 
 
 
(-0.02) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
  spouse’ 
 work status 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.06 -0.12 0.05 0.01 1 
 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (-0.18) 
  
*Power in parentheses 
*trust: stock of trust in the region in the specific year. atrust: stock of trust at the 
agegroup level. itrust: individual’s attitude of trust, educ: years of education, male: 




Table A3. Descriptive Statistics 
Working Status Variable N Mean Standard Deviation 
Working full-time trust 23824 .3725887 .0837506 
 itrust 17647 .4012013 .4901555 
 trusthc 20409 29.96384 10.20079 
 educ 26706 13.49453 2.90216 
 age 26756 39.62816 11.51763 
 male 26756 .5608462 .4962932 
 white 26756 .8130513 .3898776 
 black 26756 .1339886 .3406465 
 childs 26678 1.681385 1.599656 
 splabor 26756 .3992749 .4897585 
Working part-time trust 4486 .3802381 .0825535 
 itrust 3239 .4022847 .4904345 
 trusthc 3838 30.48842 10.61557 
 educ 4986 13.10489 2.773934 
 age 4996 37.77882 13.33682 
 male 4996 .2984388 .4576188 
 white 4996 .8164532 .3871529 
 black 4996 .1267014 .3326714 
 childs 4988 1.725541 1.700403 
 splabor 4996 .4257406 .4945043 
Temporarily not working trust 963 .3772134 .0837658 
 itrust 705 .3886525 .4877902 
 trusthc 840 30.87308 10.08106 
 educ 1117 13.19606 2.989537 
 age 1119 42.32261 12.07248 
 male 1119 .4763181 .4996622 
 white 1119 .8275246 .3779621 
 black 1119 .1322609 .3389257 
 childs 1115 1.901345 1.729236 
 splabor 1119 .3190349 .466311 
Unemployed or laid off trust 1506 .3709451 .0826376 
 itrust 1079 .2845227 .451396 
 trusthc 1307 28.79012 11.14169 
 educ 1726 12.0226 2.75156 
 age 1731 37.02369 12.38193 
 male 1731 .6452917 .4785631 
 white 1731 .7071057 .4552219 
 black 1731 .2229925 .4163736 
 childs 1723 1.531631 1.703148 
 splabor 1731 .1993068 .3995946 
42 
Retired trust 1552 .3667907 .0834543 
 itrust 1100 .4163636 .4931796 
 trusthc 1338 31.17585 9.450055 
 educ 1738 12.20483 3.554581 
 age 1743 59.75043 5.980855 
 male 1743 .6138841 .4869974 
 white 1743 .842226 .3646335 
 black 1743 .1376936 .344677 
 childs 1739 2.384129 1.858548 
 splabor 1743 .1967871 .3976842 
Student trust 1496 .3795014 .0811884 
 itrust 1119 .3279714 .4696843 
 trusthc 1284 29.18242 11.02205 
 educ 1667 13.63287 2.351383 
 age 1668 25.82134 8.635134 
 male 1668 .4448441 .4970976 
 white 1668 .7344125 .441778 
 black 1668 .1744604 .3796187 
 childs 1662 .6383875 1.272993 
 splabor 1668 .1492806 .3564717 
Keeping house trust 5908 .3825383 .0902345 
 itrust 4650 .3202151 .4666093 
 trusthc 5203 29.90153 10.35588 
 educ 6993 11.72444 2.742839 
 age 7007 41.02155 13.25444 
 male 7007 .0385329 .1924926 
 white 7007 .7920651 .405859 
 black 7007 .162409 .3688519 
 childs 6995 2.594139 1.818264 
 splabor 7007 .5772799 .494027 
Other trust 869 .3520929 .0778975 
 itrust 644 .2189441 .4138521 
 trusthc 673 29.12548 10.84193 
 educ 936 11.49573 3.368934 
 age 946 47.1871 12.11199 
 male 946 .5295983 .4993872 
 white 946 .7071882 .4552935 
 black 946 .2336152 .423354 
 childs 941 2.053135 1.983266 
 splabor 946 .1871036 .390201 
Total trust 40604 .3745246 .0845007 
 itrust 30183 .3783255 .4849774 
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 trusthc 34892 29.99173 10.32873 
 educ 45869 13.03503 2.968442 
 age 45966 40.02465 12.81028 
 male 45966 .4509855 .4975972 
 white 45966 .8026585 .3979966 
 black 45966 .1444981 .3515979 
 childs 45841 1.821666 1.711966 
 splabor 45966 .398686 .4896332 
 
*trust: stock of trust. itrust: individual’s attitude of trust, trusthc: % of people who trust in 
the ancestors’ country, splabor: dummy = 1 if spouse is in the labor force  
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Table A4. Marginal Effects of Probit Estimation from Table 2 
-Column (1)  
 
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects           Number of obs =  35998 
Log likelihood = -18426.971                                    Pseudo R2     = 0.1177 
   
variable      dF/dx         Std. Err.        Z        P>z           x-bar        [    95% C.I.   ] 
   
trust          .0941305     .0502431       1.87      0.061      .36833       -.004344  .192605 
age           .0466473     .0012952      35.94  0.000       40.0902      .044109  .049186 
age2         -.0005779    .0000152    -37.87 0.000      1766.69       -.000608 -.000548 
male*       .1686366     .0046132      35.0       0.000       .448247        .159595  .177678 
educ         .0236442     .0008729     26.96 0.000       13.252          .021933  .025355 
married*  -.0126609    .0074732     -1.69 0.091      .535196        -.027308  .001986 
childs       -.0187451    .0016495    -11.36 0.000      1.75013         -.021978 -.015512 
splabor*   .0143403     .0074474     1.92 0.055     .388633          -.000256  .028937 
otherace*  -.0138509   .0102485   -1.37 0.171      .062615         -.033938  .006236 
black*      -.0456425    .0073513    -6.41 0.000      .142813         -.060051 -.031234 
unempr~e   -.0047213  .0031878    -1.48 0.139      5.99152       -.010969  .001527 
 
obs. P    .7330963 
pred. P    .7583858  (at x-bar) 
   
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
z and P>z correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
 





Probit regression, reporting marginal effects           Number of obs =  25822 
Log likelihood = -13171.619                             Pseudo R2     = 0.1238 
 
 
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
z and P>z correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
 
Note: The results for region and year dummies not reported. 
 
  
variable       dF/dx         Std. Err.          z         P>z        x-bar           [    95% C.I.   ] 
 
itrust*        .032069      .0061092         5.19     0.000        .369181      .020095  .044043 
age            .0471095    .0015414         30.5     0.000        40.0024      .044088  .050131 
age2          -.0005844   .0000181     -32.21     0.000        1759.82      -.00062 -.000549 
male*        .1730919    .0054851      30.26      0.000        .452831     .162341  .183843 
educ           .0233852    .0010643     21.88      0.000        13.1827      .021299  .025471 
married*     -.0045847   .0088531    -0.52      0.605        .54136        .021936  .012767 
childs          -.0186805   .0019421    -9.62     0.000        1.76214        -.022487 -.014874 
splabor*       .0027955  .0088361      0.32     0.752         .390287        -.014523  .020114 
otherace*     -.0055422    .012341    -0.45    0.652          .059058        -.02973  .018646 
black*          -.045413   .0087767    -5.34     0.000         .141933        -.062615 -.028211 
unempr~e    -.0026107   .0035534    -0.73    0.463        6.01044         -.009575  .004354 
 
obs. P     .731082 
pred. P    .7576996  (at x-bar) 
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Table A5. Marginal Effects of Probit Regression from Table 3 
 
Marginal effects after ivprobit 
y  = Probability of positive outcome (predict, p) 
=  .75896767 
  
variable          dy/dx         Std. Err.          z         P>z      [    95% C.I.   ]            X 
trust              .3016084        .1              3.02       0.003      .105606   .4976      -.002461 
age               .0469984        .00143      32.86      0.000     .044195  .049801     40.2043 
age2            -.0005821       .00002      -34.74     0.000     -.000615 -.000549    1777.9 
male*          .1702871       .00505       33.69      0.000      .160381  .180193     .454618 
educ            .0223636       .00099       22.69      0.000      .020432  .024296      13.3114 
married*     -.0155381      .0081         -1.92       0.055     -.031417  .000341     .548419 
childs          -.0182354      .00179      -10.19      0.000      -.021742 -.014729    1.75905 
splabor*       .0047198      .00805        0.59       0.558      -.011067  .02050      .395333 
otherace*     -.0031073     .01172       -0.27       0.791      -.026078  .019863    .056181 
black*          -.0243565    .01013       -2.40       0.016       -.044208 -.004505   .136663 
unempl         -.0054465    .0032         -1.70       0.089      -.011721  .000828     6.22329 
  
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
z and P>z correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
 
























Spouse’ work status 0.000449 
 (0.415) 

















z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) =    11.13 Prob > chi2 = 0.0008 
 
Note: Dependent variable is a trust variable that is orthogonal of GDP per capita of the ancestral 
country. Region and year dummies were included in the regressions but their coefficients are not 
reported in the table. Ethnicity, language, and religion are the variables that indicate degrees of 










본 논문에서는 미국의 General Social Survey 데이터를 이용하여 
신뢰와 노동시장 참여의 관계를 분석한다. 미시 데이터를 활용하여 
개인적 차원 분석으로 기존에 거시적 접근을 취한 연구보다 분석의 
정교성을 높였으며, 도구변수법과 가패널(pseudo-panel) 추정법을 
이용하여 분석 결과의 신뢰성을 제고했다. 논문의 결과는 개인 
수준에서의 신뢰와 지역에서의 신뢰스톡은 노동시장 참여에 긍정적으로 
영향을 주며, 특히 상속된 신뢰도 개인의 노동시장 참여에 긍정적인 
영향을 준다는 것이다. 가패널 결과에 따르면 지역수준에서의 신뢰는 그 
지역의 노동시장참여율에 긍정적인 영향을 주지만 또래집단수준의 
신뢰는 유의미한 결과를 주지 못하는 것으로 나타났다. 
 
주요어 : 사회적 자본; 신뢰; 노동시장; 도구변수 추정법; 가패널 
분석  
학 번 : 2010-20158 
  
